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USING FAITH TO EXCLUDE
THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN DUTCH POPULISM
Stijn van Kessel 1
Religion has played a crucial role in the formation of the Dutch party system, 
and party competition in the first decades after World War II was, to a consid-
erable degree, still determined by the religious denomination of voters. Most 
religious voters were loyal to one of the three dominant ‘confessional’ parties: 
the large Catholic People’s Party (KVP) or one of the two smaller Protestant 
parties (ARP and CHU).2 Until the parliamentary election of 1963, the com-
bined vote share of the three dominant confessional parties was around 50 per 
cent. Most secular voters, on the other hand, turned either to the Labour Party 
(PvdA), representing the working class, or the Liberal Party (VVD), repre-
senting the secular middle class. The fact that voting behaviour was rather 
predictable resulted from the fact that Dutch parties and the most significant 
religious and social groups—arguably with the exception of the secular middle 
class and the VVD—were closely aligned.3 One aspect of this ‘pillarisation’ of 
society was that the electorate voted largely along traditional cleavage lines of 
religion and social class.
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 The dividing lines between the social groups gradually evaporated, in part 
due to the secularisation of society since the 1960s. Except for the secular 
middle class, the social background of the electorate continued to determine 
voting patterns quite predictably in the following decades, but by the turn of 
the twenty-first century the explanatory power of belonging to a traditional 
pillar had faded to a large extent.4 What is more, as Dutch society became 
more secularised, the level of electoral support for the three dominant confes-
sional parties began to decline. This provided an incentive for these parties to 
merge into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in 1980.
 Although Dutch voters began to choose more freely, the traditional parties 
were hardly challenged by populist parties or politicians. During the twentieth 
century, political parties often associated with populism had intermittently 
managed to enter the Dutch lower house (Tweede Kamer), but were never 
very successful (see Table 5.1).5 The Farmers’ Party (Boerenpartij) entered 
parliament in 1963, but has never received more than 4.8 per cent of the vote. 
The ethno-nationalist xenophobic parties led by Hans Janmaat in the 1980s 
and 1990s (the Centre Party and Centre Democrats) never grew to play sig-
nificant roles. Another populist party that emerged was the left-wing Socialist 
Party (SP—Socialistische Partij), a party with Maoist roots which could be 
described as a ‘populist socialist’ party in the 1990s.6 However, the party 
toned down its populist, anti-establishment rhetoric to a considerable extent 
after the 1990s.7
 It was only after the turn of the twenty-first century that a whole array of 
populist parties appeared on the Dutch political scene, though few came close 
to representation in the Dutch parliament. Two populist parties were clearly 
the most successful electorally: the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF—Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn)—although only for a short period of time—and Geert Wilders’ 
Freedom Party (PVV—Partij voor de Vrijheid). In the parliamentary election 
of 15  May 2002, the party newly founded by maverick politician Pim Fortuyn, 
a columnist and former sociology professor, broke through with 17 per cent 
of the vote—an unprecedented result for a newcomer. Fortuyn himself did 
not witness the results of the 2002 parliamentary election; on 6  May, he was 
murdered by an environmental activist. The party’s success was short-lived, 
not least due to continuous infighting after it joined a coalition government 
with the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. Mainly due to the organisa-
tional problems of the LPF, an early election was scheduled for 22  January 
2003 in which the party that had aimed to represent the late Pim Fortuyn’s 
ideas suffered a significant defeat. After the 2006 election, the party disap-
peared from the Dutch parliament altogether. At the same time, this election 
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also marked the entrance of the populist, radical right Freedom Party, which 
was founded and has since been controlled by ex-Liberal MP Geert Wilders.8 
With 5.9 per cent of the vote, Wilders’ success in this instance was still mod-
est, but in the 2010 election his party won 15.5 per cent of the vote. After this 
election, the Freedom Party provided parliamentary support to the governing 
minority coalition formed between the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. 
In the early election of 2012, the Freedom Party was among the losers, but still 
received 10.1 per cent of the vote.
Table 5.1: Populist Parties and Seats Won in Elections for the Dutch Lower House
Party Years in Parliament Record vote share
Farmers Party (Boerenpartij) 1963–1981 4.8% (1967)
Centre Party (Centrumpartij) 
Centre Democrats (Centrumdemocraten)*
1982–1986 
1989–1998
2.5% (1994)
Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij)** 1994 –present 16.6% (2006)
Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) 2002–2003 1.6% (2002)
Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) 2002–2006 17% (2002)
Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid) 2006 –present 15.5% (2010)
Source: election data from http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl
*In 1984, the Centre Party’s leader and only MP, Hans Janmaat, split from the party 
but retained his seat. In 1989, Janmaat returned to parliament as leader of the Centre 
Democrats.
** It is questionable whether the Socialist Party can still be considered a populist party.
 Over the years, populist parties have thus become a much stronger electoral 
force in the Netherlands, while the traditionally dominant position of the 
Christian Democratic parties has been eroded. As this chapter will show, it 
would be wrong to assume that populist parties have simply taken the 
Christian Democrats’ role. Neither Pim Fortuyn nor Geert Wilders has 
explicitly appealed to Christian values. This is not to say, however, that reli-
gion has been absent from the discourse of Dutch populist parties—quite the 
contrary, in fact. However, it was not Christianity, but Islam, that featured 
prominently in Fortuyn’s and Wilders’ discourse. Instead of using religion as 
a means to conceive of the ‘ordinary’ people, the Dutch right-wing populist 
parties used it mainly as a means to identify those who did not belong to the 
‘heartland’ to which they appealed.9
 This chapter will focus firstly on the political programmes of both Pim 
Fortuyn and the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, considering in particular the 
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limited role of religion as a means for populists to conceive of Dutch culture and 
identity. Secondly, it will discuss the attention devoted to Islam in the pro-
grammes of populist politicians. Thirdly, the chapter will look at the relationship 
between the Freedom Party and Church authorities before finally outlining the 
(lack of ) electoral potential for religious populism in the Netherlands.
‘Liberal’ instead of Religious Populism10
Pim Fortuyn railed above all against the ‘Purple’ coalitions that were formed 
between 1994 and 2002, including the ‘blue’ Liberals, the ‘red’ Social 
Democrats and the social liberals of the smaller D66 party. During this period, 
the Christian Democrats were excluded from government for the first time 
since 1918. After various failed attempts to build a political career via the 
traditional mainstream parties, Fortuyn became leader of the newly founded 
party Livable Netherlands (LN—Leefbar Nederland) in November 2001. He 
was expelled from this party by February 2002, following controversial state-
ments in a newspaper interview (notably, Fortuyn stated that Islam could be 
perceived as a ‘backward culture’).11 With only a few months to go before the 
parliamentary election in May, Fortuyn founded his own party, the Pim 
Fortuyn List (LPF). This party could immediately count on substantial sup-
port in the opinion polls, thereby eclipsing Fortuyn’s old party, Livable 
Netherlands.
 In his book (and, essentially, political programme) The Shambles of Eight 
Years Purple, Fortuyn stated that ‘The Netherlands should become a real lively 
democracy of and for the ordinary people, and depart from the elite party 
democracy which we are currently acquainted with.’12 In the official election 
manifesto it was argued that the ‘Purple’ coalitions had left the Netherlands 
with a rigid and self-satisfied political culture of appointed executives lacking 
creative or learning capacities.13 Apart from the party’s populist features, the 
LPF’s more substantive political programme was eclectic.14 Fortuyn promoted 
a free-market economy, took a tough line on law and order issues and stressed 
the need to cut red tape in the healthcare and education sectors. At the same 
time, his position on moral or cultural issues like drugs and traditional mar-
riage was very liberal. However, it was Fortuyn’s stance on immigration and 
the cultural integration of minorities that attracted the most controversy. 
According to the LPF manifesto, overcrowding in the Netherlands was lead-
ing to growing societal tensions.15 The party deemed it necessary to resist the 
immigration of—often unemployed and unskilled—foreigners into the coun-
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try. The party manifesto spoke further of problems caused by the social-cul-
tural ‘backwardness’ of minority groups in society and related problems such 
as criminality and discrimination against women, especially in fundamentalist 
Islamic circles.
 In his discourse, Fortuyn made a distinction between a native Dutch popu-
lation (although by no means in an ethnic sense) and minorities whose cus-
toms did not conform to the Dutch way of life. The 2002 election manifesto 
stated that these minorities often arrived from countries untouched by the 
‘century-long Jewish-Christian-Humanist developments’ that had occurred in 
Europe.16 Aside from this—somewhat broad—conception of the religious and 
philosophical roots of European countries, Fortuyn did not truly use religion 
to define Dutch identity and values. Instead, he saw the Netherlands as a 
country of liberal Enlightenment values, and he was concerned about these 
being undermined.17 The 2002 manifesto, for instance, explicitly expressed the 
view that all citizens had equal rights and duties, irrespective of race, gender, 
faith or sexual orientation.18 Fortuyn’s ideology was at odds with the idea of a 
diverse, multicultural society in which liberal principles were put at risk. In 
this sense, Fortuyn evoked an ostensibly liberal heartland, but was, so to speak, 
intolerant of intolerant minorities. Fortuyn himself was also hardly the 
embodiment of religious conservatism. For a start, he was openly homosexual, 
and quite explicit about his rather tempestuous love life. Van Holsteyn and 
Irwin further describe Fortuyn’s lifestyle: ‘Ferrari, Bentley with chauffeur, 
butler, two lap dogs, portraits of John F.  Kennedy in his lavishly decorated 
Rotterdam home which he referred to as Palazzo di Pietro’.19
 Following Fortuyn’s murder, his party’s subsequent unsuccessful record in 
government and its subsequent electoral decline, Geert Wilders’ Freedom 
Party became the most successful new populist party. As an MP for the 
Liberal Party, Wilders had become increasingly critical of Islam, and he even-
tually broke with his party in September 2004 after a conflict with the parlia-
mentary leader over the issue of Turkish EU membership—Wilders was very 
much against Turkish accession to the Union.20 He formed his own one-man 
faction Groep Wilders (Wilders Group), and founded his Freedom Party 
(literally, ‘Party for Freedom’, PVV) in February 2006. In its early documents, 
the populist character of Wilders’ party was already visible. In his ‘declaration 
of independence’ from the Liberal Party, for instance, Wilders declared: ‘I do 
not want this country to be hijacked by an elite of cowardly and frightened 
people (from whichever party) any longer. […] I therefore intend to challenge 
this elite on all fronts. I want to return this country to its citizens.’21 Wilders 
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expressed his contempt for the self-sustaining political system, which suppos-
edly stood isolated from society and argued that ‘politicians should no longer 
be deaf to the problems troubling ordinary people in every-day life’.22
 While Fortuyn never explicitly portrayed the Dutch people as a homogene-
ous body,23 Geert Wilders, from the end of the 2000s, constructed a more 
specific image of his ‘heartland’ of ordinary, hard-working Dutch people, 
epitomised by the fictional couple Henk and Ingrid. Wilders was also more 
explicitly patriotic than Pim Fortuyn, and increasingly used nationalistic dis-
course over time.24 In the Freedom Party’s manifestos, symbols such as the 
Netherlands’ maritime past—the Dutch flag flying across the oceans for cen-
turies—and the nation’s dyke-building skills were used.25 Symbols of 
Christianity, however, were absent from these patriotic conceptions of the 
Dutch heartland.
 Nevertheless, and similarly to Fortuyn, Geert Wilders repeatedly referred 
to the ‘Christian/Jewish/Humanistic’ culture of the Netherlands; the 
Freedom Party even proposed a new Article 1 of the Constitution stating that 
this culture should remain dominant.26 In the 2010 manifesto, ‘Jewish-
Christian and humanist values’ were perceived to be fundamental to the 
Netherlands’ success.27 Both religious and secular citizens, it was further 
noted, could be proud of this.28 References to Jewish, Christian or humanistic 
values were absent, however, from the Freedom Party’s 2012 parliamentary 
election manifesto.
 In terms of substantive policies, Wilders’ initial programme was similar to 
Fortuyn’s, but more radical concerning immigration and integration.29 
Wilders perceived Islam to be a violent ‘ideology’ and argued that Dutch 
culture had to be protected against the process of ‘Islamisation’. The 2010 
manifesto nevertheless argued that the PVV was not a single-issue party, as 
Islamisation allegedly touched upon a range of social issues: ‘Economically it 
is a disaster, it damages the quality of our education, it undermines security on 
the streets, causes an exodus out of our cities, drives out Jewish and gay people, 
and flushes the century-long emancipation of women down the toilet.’30 
Similarly to Pim Fortuyn’s message, as can be seen in this quote, the Freedom 
Party manifesto called for the preservation of Dutch liberal values threatened 
by the rise of Islam. Neither the LPF nor the PVV could thus be considered 
as examples of ‘classical’ extreme-right parties if we consider their organisa-
tional origins—both parties were essentially personal projects and shunned 
associations with extreme-right movements—or their political ideology.
 Whether Wilders was a true liberal at heart is, however, a moot point. He 
worked together with conservative publicists Bart Jan Spruyt—who broke ties 
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with the Freedom Party as early as 2006—and Paul Belien, who positioned 
himself strongly against Islam, but also against abortion and euthanasia.31 In 
addition, Wilders built up links with various American neo-conservative 
think tanks.32 Wilders’ own ideology also contained some unmistakably con-
servative elements. The Freedom Party, it can be argued, presented a pro-
gramme of ‘militant civic nationalism’33 characterised by a clear dislike of 
cultural diversity. The 2010 Freedom Party manifesto argued that the ‘culture 
of the sixties’ was to be abandoned, and that children at school should be 
taught a ‘canon of Dutch history’ with particular emphasis on the 
Netherlands’ ‘heroic national history’.34 Somewhat analogously to Fortuyn’s 
previous criticism of the ‘left-wing Church’, Wilders blamed progressive (left-
wing) elites for undermining traditional norms and values. Furthermore, 
although Wilders presented himself as a defender of women and of gay rights, 
these issues were mainly discussed as part of Wilders’ warnings against the 
threat of Islam. In its manifestos, the Freedom Party remained silent about 
moral-cultural issues such as euthanasia and abortion. When it (finally) 
expressed a position on the latter issue in March 2011, the Freedom Party 
parliamentary group actually favoured more restrictive legislation, when com-
pared with the existing law.
 It was not Christianity, however, that inspired Wilders’ more conservative 
viewpoints. According to Koen Vossen, ‘[Wilders’] main objection to the 
progressive elite is what he terms their cultural and moral relativism, leading 
to a refusal to distinguish between superior and inferior cultures, as a result of 
which the West has become weakened and has not recognised the Islamic 
threat in time.’35 As far as the role of religion in Wilders’ discourse is con-
cerned, negative references to Islam were clearly more dominant than positive 
references to traditional Christian norms and values.
Characterisation of the Religious ‘Other’
Populist entrepreneurs in the Netherlands have not explicitly presented them-
selves as defenders of a ‘good Christian’ people. As clarified by the previous 
section, however, religion did play an important role in the discourses of both 
Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. Both politicians pointed out the malign 
effects of the growing presence and influence of Islam in Dutch society, and it 
seems that Wilders’ position on Islam has become more radical over the 
years.36 By the time Wilders had founded his own party, much of his discourse 
revolved around this theme, and in early 2008, he attracted substantial con-
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troversy with his seventeen-minute anti-Islam film Fitna. Tensions reached 
their peak before the film was actually released; since its contents were 
unknown, there was widespread concern about the reactions it might provoke 
among the Muslim community. The film—the release of which triggered little 
societal unrest in the end—focused mainly on the violent and intolerant 
aspects of Islam and the threat of Islamisation in the Netherlands and beyond.
 In its 2010 election manifesto, the Freedom Party went so far as to argue 
that ‘Islam is predominantly a political ideology; a totalitarian doctrine aimed 
at dominance, violence and suppression’.37 Islam was mainly associated with 
threats to culture, security and freedom of speech. The party claimed that 
many Muslims supported Sharia and that ‘the Koran dictates behaviour which 
is incompatible with our Rechtsstaat, such as anti-Semitism, discrimination 
[against] women, killing infidels and [waging a] holy war until Islam has 
achieved world dominance’.38 Wilders not only blamed the progressive elite 
for the decay of cultural norms and pride, but also for Islam’s growing influ-
ence. The 2010 Freedom Party manifesto even spoke of an ‘alliance’ between 
the left-wing elite and Islam.39 The PVV associated the dominance of ‘mouldy 
left ideals’ with ‘the hated multicultural experiment’ and its malign effects, and 
the manifesto concluded that ‘Islam does not bring us cultural enrichment, 
but sharia-fatalism’.40 In order to counter the process of Islamisation of Dutch 
society, the party for instance proposed to stop immigration from Islamic 
countries and the building of mosques, as well as banning the Koran and clos-
ing Islamic schools.
 At the start of the decade, voicing concerns about immigration and the lack 
of social integration of the Muslim minority proved to be very effective elec-
torally. Indeed, Fortuyn’s success is generally linked to his hard line on the 
salient issues of immigration and integration, which at the time were insuffi-
ciently addressed by the major parties.41 World-wide religiously motivated 
terrorist attacks and the murder in 2004 of the controversial filmmaker Theo 
van Gogh by an Islamic fundamentalist are likely to have bolstered concerns 
about Islam. After the demise of the Pim Fortuyn List, Geert Wilders filled 
the space on the radical right. The Freedom Party reached its electoral zenith 
in 2010, despite the fact that this election was fought more over the economic 
crisis and austerity measures than over the alleged Islamisation of society.42
 In the parliamentary election campaign of 2012, the euro crisis and pro-
posed austerity measures almost entirely eclipsed issues of immigration and 
integration.43 In Wilders’ campaign, Islam also played a relatively small role. 
In the televised debates, the Freedom Party leader mostly denounced 
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‘Eurocrats’, deceitful ouzo-drinking Greeks and Eastern European labourers 
threatening to take Dutch jobs. In previous years, Wilders had already 
adopted a Eurosceptic position, but now he went so far as to promote a Dutch 
exit from the European Union (EU) altogether. Yet despite the lack of focus 
on the issue, it would be wrong to suggest that Wilders had changed his mind 
about the influence of Islam in Dutch society. Although the Freedom Party 
prioritised ‘Europe’ to a greater extent than before, the statements concerning 
Islam, immigration and integration remained practically unchanged.44 What 
is more, in an interview on 27  December 2012, Wilders announced that fight-
ing Islam would be his priority again in the coming year.45
 The Freedom Party has thus clearly continued to use Islam to distinguish 
between the native ‘heartland’ and the ‘outsiders’ threatening it. Indeed, 
events in the years following the 2012 election have provided Wilders with 
scope to revitalise his anti-Islamic discourse. The Charlie Hebdo shootings on 
7  January 2015, for instance, were described by the PVV leader as an ‘act of 
war against everything that we stand for: our freedom of speech, our freedom 
of expression, our freedom of press, by people inspired, once again, by Islam, 
by the Koran, by Muhammed’.46 He furthermore criticised the political elites 
in Europe for ignoring the problem and for their lack of willingness to address 
the issue. Later that year, on 3  May, Wilders gave a keynote speech at the ‘First 
Annual Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest’ in Garland, Texas, which fea-
tured cartoons satirising the Islamic prophet.47 In addition, the advance of 
Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, and the concomitant decision of 
European jihadists to join the battle (and possibly return home later) were 
portrayed by Wilders as severe security threats. The PVV leader expressed the 
view that it was best to let Dutch jihadists leave, strip them of their Dutch 
nationality and refuse them re-entry into the country.48 Finally, Wilders also 
voiced concern about the surge in migration into Europe across the 
Mediterranean Sea from an anti-immigration as well as a security angle; on 
several occasions the populist politician picked up on reports that boats con-
tained not only asylum seekers, but also IS fighters.49
Little Support from Religious Authorities
Since neither successful nor unsuccessful populist parties have made strong 
appeals for the preservation of traditional Christian values, it is unsurprising 
that there have been no official links between them and Church authorities. 
What is more, the populist parties could count on little religious backing. 
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Relevant data concerning Pim Fortuyn’s short-lived party is lacking, but in a 
survey in the Protestant daily newspaper Nederlands Dagblad, Protestant 
Church leaders were asked about their own and their followers’ views on 
Geert Wilders.50 More than three-quarters of the 1,228 respondents agreed 
with the statement that ‘a Christian cannot vote for the Freedom Party’. As 
regards their congregations’ opinions, a third of the respondents thought 
there was some support for Wilders in their community. However, nine out 
of ten clergymen thought that there were not many, or just a few, Wilders-
enthusiasts in their congregation. The former secretary-general of the 
Protestant Church of the Netherlands (PKN), Bas Plaisier, had denounced 
Geert Wilders’ rhetoric on previous occasions. According to Plaisier, Wilders’ 
philosophy was incompatible with the principles and message of the Church, 
since the politician failed to show respect for people of different faiths.51
 Catholic Church authorities, too, have criticised the Freedom Party. Bishop 
Gerard de Korte, for example, argued that Wilders did call attention to genu-
ine problems, but that his solutions were crude, and that his rhetoric divided 
people—something that he deemed irreconcilable with the Catholic social 
philosophy.52 In a previous interview, the Bishop had stated that he was wor-
ried about the violent side of Islam, but that it was necessary to maintain an 
open dialogue, without hurting the feelings of Muslims in the way that 
Wilders did.53 In an interview published in May 2009, Emeritus Bishop Tiny 
Muskens thought it was ‘mean’ that Wilders rallied people against Islam for 
political purposes, and that Dutch people were probably wise enough to vote 
for a different party.54 Despite this, Muskens also expressed his own concerns 
about radical Islam.
 Such concerns were certainly more widespread among the Dutch clergy. 
Although the ecumenical Council of Churches had described Wilders’ short 
film Fitna as ‘one-sided and provocative’,55 some priests reviewed the film 
more favourably, with one arguing that ‘[the] Koran and violence were insepa-
rably linked to one another’.56 Among the Protestant Church leaders in the 
Nederland Dagblad survey, furthermore, a quarter were concerned about the 
Islamisation of the Netherlands.57 This rose to about 50 per cent of the 
respondents located in the Dutch ‘bible belt’—despite the fact that this is an 
area with relatively few Muslim residents. On balance, however, Church 
authorities have been critical rather than supportive of Wilders’ agenda, a 
response that was presumably felt by Wilders himself, who in March 2010 
suggested that the Church should take a tougher line against Islam, instead of 
joining politicians in their political correctness.58
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 The fact that Churches were generally critical of Wilders was again evident 
on 23  March 2014, when the Protestant Church of the Netherlands organised 
an ecumenical service against racism.59 Although the organisers stressed that 
the event did not constitute an ‘anti-Wilders service’, it was clearly a response 
to Wilders’ remarks on the eve of the municipal elections of 19  March. The 
PVV leader had asked a crowd of supporters whether they wanted more or less 
of the Labour Party, more or less of the European Union and, most controver-
sially, more or fewer Moroccans. After the audience shouted ‘less, less, less’ to 
all three, Wilders assured his supporters that his party would ‘take care of that’.
 Apart from the Church authorities, the Freedom Party also received criti-
cism from other representatives of the more broadly defined Christian ‘pillar’. 
Doekle Terpstra, a CDA member and former chairman of the Christian Trade 
Union CNV, has been particularly vocal in his critique of Wilders’ polarising 
discourse, which he described in an op-ed article as ‘a threat to a society in 
which toleration, hospitability and solidarity are core values’.60 Prominent 
former Christian Democratic politicians also expressed their distaste for the 
Freedom Party’s politics, particularly during the coalition formation process 
of 2010 (which resulted in a Liberal-Christian Democrat minority coalition 
with support from the Freedom Party). Among those who opposed the coali-
tion because of Wilders’ party’s involvement were the former chairman of the 
Protestant ARP, Willem Aantjes, and former CDA minister, Cees Veerman. 
The acting CDA Justice Minister, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, also expressed his 
opposition, while acting Health Minister, Ab Klink, resigned as negotiator 
during the formation process—and gave up his seat in parliament—as he 
would not support any cooperation with the Freedom Party.
 Although Wilders could count on little in the way of support from the 
Dutch Christian pillar, there is considerable evidence showing that the 
Freedom Party has relied on financial backing from conservative Christian 
and Jewish organisations in the United States.61 Over the course of 2012, 
several former Freedom Party MPs provided insights concerning the party’s 
funding sources (after resigning, disgruntled, it should be said). Hero 
Brinkman stated that the party received hundreds of thousands of euros from 
American donors, while Wim Kortenoeven confirmed that Wilders was very 
active in lobbying Jewish organisations for money.62 Indeed, as well as con-
servative lobby groups, several Jewish organisations such as the Children of 
the Jewish Holocaust have openly admitted to sponsoring Wilders.63
 The good relationship between Geert Wilders and sympathetic Jewish 
organisations goes further than merely sharing a common enemy in Islamic 
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extremism. Wilders has said he feels a strong affinity with Judaism and the 
state of Israel, and has explained that his stay in Israel and travels through the 
Middle East as an adolescent (aged between seventeen and nineteen) contrib-
uted to shaping his ideas.64 Other (former) Freedom Party MPs, such as 
Raymond de Roon and Wim Kortenoeven, shared Wilders’ explicit pro-
Israeli views or were active in Jewish interest organisations. Pro-Israeli senti-
ments were also clearly expressed in Freedom Party manifestos: ‘For the 
Freedom Party the Jewish State has always been a beacon of hope, progress 
and western civilisation. The cheap Israel-bashing of the allied forces of Islam 
and the left should be countered on all fronts.’65 With regard to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, the Freedom Party stated that the Netherlands and the 
EU should not demand any further territorial concessions from Israel. The 
party also claimed the conflict had an ideological rather than a territorial 
character, and spoke of ‘a conflict between the reason of the free West and the 
barbarism of the Islamic ideology’.66
 The Freedom Party did not gain unanimous support from the Jewish com-
munity, however. Some American Jewish organisations, such as the Anti-
Defamation League, have voiced their disapproval of the party on the basis of 
Wilders’ intolerant message.67 Jewish religious authorities in the Netherlands 
have not openly backed Wilders either. Similarly to various Christian Church 
leaders, Awraham Soetendorp, a prominent progressive Jewish Rabbi, even 
distanced himself strongly from Wilders’ ideology on the grounds that the 
politician hurt people in their ‘deepest being’.68 What is more, several Jewish 
organisations and alleged sponsors of the Freedom Party reacted very nega-
tively to the party’s support for a ban on the ritual slaughter of animals.69 In 
electoral terms, the results of a survey carried out by the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute in 2009 suggested that, despite 
Wilders’ pro-Israeli stance, the Freedom Party could rely on the support of 
only 2 per cent of Jewish people in the Netherlands.70
The (Lack of ) Electoral Scope for Religious Populism
From a purely electoral perspective, there appears to be little incentive for 
populists to place more emphasis on the Christian roots of Dutch society. The 
gradual decline of Christian Democracy as a dominant political tradition was 
noted earlier in this chapter. For most of the period between 1946 and 1967, 
the three confessional parties together controlled a majority of the seats in the 
Dutch Lower House. After the official merger of the three parties into the 
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CDA, the Christian Democrats’ seat share dropped to forty-eight of the 150 
seats in 1981. During the period of the ‘Purple coalitions’ (1994–2002), the 
Christian Democrats were out of office for the first time since 1918, but they 
did become the largest party in parliament again in the eight years that fol-
lowed. In the parliamentary election of 2010, however, the party received just 
twenty-one seats, an all-time low at that point. In the early election of 2012, 
the CDA lost a further eight seats after receiving only 8.5 per cent of the vote, 
becoming the fifth party in parliament in terms of size. The (minor) gains 
made by the smaller Christian parties failed to compensate for the electoral 
misfortunes of the CDA, suggesting that the electoral scope for religiously 
inspired political platforms has decreased to a large extent. Although religion 
may still prove a good predictor of voting behaviour,71 the absolute number of 
religious voters in the Netherlands has dwindled.72 This has consequences for 
the traditionally dominant Christian Democrats and also for the smaller reli-
gious parties in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that their support levels have 
remained stable, the Christian Union (CU) and the Reformed Political Party 
(SGP), the two parties most clearly defined by their religious appeal, attract 
only a small percentage of the nationwide vote.73
Table 5.2: Answer to the Question: Are You Religious?
Freedom Party (PVV) 
voters
Christian Democrat (CDA) 
voters
All respondents
Yes 39.8% 83.6% 47.9%
No 60.2% 16.4% 52.1%
N 241 262 2613
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) 2010.74
Note: only valid answers are included.
 A close look at the Freedom Party’s voters in the 2010 election further 
suggests that a more religious course would probably not hold much appeal 
for Geert Wilders’ supporters (see Table 5.2). Data from the 2010 Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) suggest that about 40 per cent of 
Wilders’ supporters were religious, a figure below the average of almost 50 per 
cent when all respondents are included. Among Christian Democrat voters, 
on the other hand, 83 per cent claimed to be religious. Data from the 2012 
DPES survey indicate that these figures had essentially remained the same by 
the time of the following election.75 Considering the overall low levels of 
religiosity among Freedom Party voters, most of Wilders’ own supporters 
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would probably not be overly impressed by a greater appeal to Christian val-
ues. Then again, one might suppose that ‘religious populism’ could appeal to 
more devout CDA supporters who are dissatisfied with the current state of 
political affairs, or concerned about the role of Islam in Dutch society.
 Furthermore, even without an overt religious appeal, Wilders managed to 
attract a considerable number of voters who had previously opted for the 
Christian Democrats. According to a study undertaken by Van der Meer et al., 
10.4 per cent of those who voted for the CDA in 2006 switched to the Freedom 
Party four years later.76 Of the eight largest parties in the Dutch Parliament, only 
the Liberals lost more voters to the Freedom Party (15.8 per cent of VVD voters 
switched to the PVV in 2010). The Freedom Party did particularly well in the 
traditionally Catholic province of Limburg in the south, which is also Wilders’ 
home province.77 This region was previously the heartland of the Catholic 
People’s Party, and subsequently the CDA.  While the Pim Fortuyn List also did 
well in this region in 2002, south Limburg could truly be seen as the Freedom 
Party’s stronghold after the party broke through.
 It has been alleged that certain theological or cultural differences between 
Catholics and Protestants (or even between different groups of Dutch 
Protestants) might explain why particular religious groups may be more (or 
less) inclined to share Wilders’ monocultural conception of Dutch society.78 
It is questionable, however, whether Wilders’ success in the traditionally 
Catholic south is related to the religious convictions of the voters living there. 
Results from a study conducted by Van der Brug et al. provide no reason to 
assume that Catholic voters are more likely than Protestant voters to support 
far-right parties.79 Moreover, the Freedom Party has actually been relatively 
popular in some of the Protestant ‘bible belt’ areas in the Netherlands as 
well.80 Van der Meer et al. showed that the PVV managed to attract a consid-
erable share (9.1 per cent) of voters who had previously voted for the Christian 
Union, a party founded as the result of a merger between two Protestant 
parties.81 A smaller share of Reformed Political Party (SGP) voters had made 
the switch to the Freedom Party, yet 17.4 per cent of those who voted SGP in 
2010 had at some point expressed their intention to vote PVV in opinion 
polls conducted in the years prior to the 2010 election.82
 Certainly not all Christian voters felt an affinity with the Freedom Party’s 
programme. As well as (former) party representatives, many grassroots CDA 
members expressed their disapproval at the formation of the Liberal-Christian 
Democrat coalition, which relied on the parliamentary support of the Freedom 
Party. A significant share of Christian Democrat members who subscribed to 
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values such as freedom of religion (and of religious education), hospitality 
towards asylum seekers and generosity towards the developing world were criti-
cal of Wilders’ programme, which was at odds with these very values. About 
one-third of the members voted ‘no’ during a party congress in October 2010, 
which was held to decide on the Christian Democrats’ participation in the 
minority coalition. Among the members of their Liberal coalition partner, the 
formation of the minority coalition caused much less of a debate.
Table 5.3: Probability of Future Vote for the Freedom Party
1–3 (not likely) 4–7 (uncertain) 8–10 (likely) N
2010 CDA voters 80.6% 13.8% 5.5% 253
All non-PVV voters 71.7% 19.7% 8.6% 1904
2012 CDA voters 87.3% 10.8% 2.0% 102
All non-PVV voters 78.0% 15.2% 6.9% 1339
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) 2010 and 2012.
Note: Respondents have been placed in the three categories by the author, and the 
labels represent the author’s interpretation of the survey item values. Only valid 
answers are included.
 Although the other two-thirds of the CDA members eventually endorsed 
the minority coalition, DPES data suggest that few of those who voted for the 
Christian Democrats in 2010 or 2012 were likely to make a future switch to 
the Freedom Party (see Table 5.3). Only 5.5 per cent of the CDA-voting 
respondents in 2010 thought it was likely that they would ever vote for the 
Freedom Party (providing an answer ranging between eight and ten on a ten-
point scale). Less than 1 per cent of Christian Democrat voters surveyed 
thought they would ‘certainly’ vote for Wilders’ party one day (giving an 
answer of ten). On the other hand, over 80 per cent thought it unlikely that 
they would ever vote for the Freedom Party, providing an answer ranging from 
one to three. At the same time, 59.3 per cent of Christian Democrat support-
ers indicated that they would ‘never’ vote for the Freedom Party (giving an 
answer of one). The data suggest that most Christian Democrat voters in 2010 
were also less likely than other non-Freedom Party voters to support Wilders’ 
party in the future. This may indicate that in the 2010 election Wilders had 
largely depleted the reservoir of former CDA voters willing to vote for the 
Freedom Party. What is more, compared with the 2010 data, CDA supporters 
in the parliamentary election of 2012 expressed an even lower likelihood of 
ever voting PVV.83
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 Although voters have switched from parties with a religious appeal to the 
populist radical right in the past, a substantial number of Christian voters 
disagree with Wilders’ key policies concerning Islam, immigration and the 
developing world.84 At the same time, it is highly questionable whether 
Wilders, or any populist party in general, would benefit from campaigning on 
the basis of an explicitly religious platform. After all, the Netherlands has 
become increasingly secularised,85 a phenomenon illustrated by the gradual 
decline of the Christian Democratic party family.
Conclusion
Populist parties and entrepreneurs in contemporary Dutch politics have 
refrained from building an image of a religious ‘heartland’ and appealing to 
‘good Christian’ people. This also applies to the most electorally successful 
populist parties: the Pim Fortuyn List and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party. 
Both Fortuyn and Wilders claimed to defend Dutch culture as shaped by 
liberal Enlightenment values, even though conservative elements could be 
found in the discourse of the latter politician in particular. Apart from refer-
ring to Jewish-Christian and humanist values, neither the Pim Fortuyn List 
nor the Freedom Party explicitly used religious symbols in their portrayal of 
Dutch identity.
 Still, religion did play a prominent role in both of these populist political 
discourses. Rather than using religion to define those who belonged to the 
‘heartland’ they appealed to, however, it was mainly employed as a means to 
identify the ‘others’, whose faith was considered to be incompatible with Dutch 
culture and values. Both Fortuyn and Wilders saw Islam—in terms of the immi-
gration of Muslims, as well as their lack of social integration—as the main threat 
to Dutch culture. Whereas Fortuyn placed issues related to immigration and 
integration firmly on the political agenda in 2002, Wilders reaped electoral 
success on the basis of a harsher anti-Islamic discourse after Fortuyn’s murder 
and his party’s demise. Wilders’ Islam-related rhetoric has certainly not softened 
in the years following the successful parliamentary election of 2010, although 
the populist radical right politician placed greater emphasis on his opposition 
to the EU in the early 2012 parliamentary election campaign. Events such as the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East gave new 
impetus to Wilders’ anti-Islamic discourse in later years.
 Despite some apparent concerns about (radical) Islam among the Dutch 
clergy, neither Fortuyn nor Wilders could rely on outspoken support from 
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Catholic or Protestant Church leaders. Instead, where Church officials com-
mented on Geert Wilders’ rhetoric, the remarks were mainly, although not 
exclusively, disapproving. Church leaders tended to criticise Wilders for 
offending Muslims with his harsh anti-Islamic criticism. There is sufficient 
reason to assume that neo-conservative and Jewish organisations, particularly 
from the United States, provided financial support to the Israel-friendly 
Freedom Party. At the national level, however, official ties between the 
Freedom Party and religious authorities have been lacking, and Wilders has 
also seemingly been unable to gain substantial electoral support from the 
Jewish community.
 As far as the electoral scope for ‘religious populism’ is concerned, it is hard 
to see how a more explicit appeal to Christian values would pay off for 
Wilders, or indeed for any other populist party. The Freedom Party’s share of 
the electorate in 2010 and 2012 largely consisted of non-religious voters, and 
although a substantial number of erstwhile Christian Democrat supporters 
voted for the Freedom Party in 2010, Wilders found it difficult to attract 
many more afterwards. Significant numbers of Christian Democrat members 
expressed their discontent with the Liberal-Christian Democrat minority 
government formed in the autumn of 2010, which relied on the Freedom 
Party’s parliamentary support. Moreover, in view of the largely secularised 
nature of Dutch society and the diminished role of religion in Dutch electoral 
politics, it is unlikely that a religiously inspired discourse would greatly 
enhance the electoral fortunes of any populist party.
